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GRAY v. THOMPSON
58 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Richard McClelland, the manager of Murphy's Mart store in
Portsmouth, worked late the evening of May 2, 1985. At approximately
9:30 p.m., Coleman Wayne Gray and Melvin Tucker, both "high" on
cocaine, entered the parking lot of Murphy's Mart in Gray's automobile
to observe the store.1
Shortly before midnight, McClelland left the store in his automo-
bile. At a stop sign, Gray pulled his automobile in front of McClelland's
car and directed McClelland to get out of his automobile and into Gray's.
Gray then drove back to the Murphy's Mart and forced McClelland at
gunpoint into the store while Tucker waited outside. 2 Approximately
one-half hour later, Gray and McClelland emerged from the store with
three gym bags filled with money.
3
Gray drove McClelland and Tucker down a small side road and
ordered McClelland to get out of the automobile. As McClelland lay face
down on the ground, Gray fired six pistol shots into McClelland's head.
4
Gray then returned to McClelland's car, doused the car with gasoline, and
set fire to it.
5
The guilt phase of Gray's capital murder trial began on December
2,1985. In response to a defense request for the Commonwealth to reveal
the evidence it planned to use to prove future dangerousness if the
defendant was found guilty, the Commonwealth's Attorney stated that he
would introduce statements that Gray had made about other crimes,
including the murders of a mother and daughter named Lisa and Shanta
Sorrell. 6
Three days later, on December 5, the jury convicted Gray on all
counts. That evening, the Commonwealth's Attorney informed the
defense that despite his earlier pledge to introduce only statements at the
penalty phase which was scheduled to begin the next morning, he now
intended to offer actual evidence of the Sorrell murders in addition to the
incriminating statements. This evidence consisted of testimony by the
1 Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313,340,356 S.E.2d 157, 172
(1987). Less than two months prior, McClelland had fired Gray's wife
from her job at the store. Eleven days after the firing Gray stole a .32-
caliber pistol from a friend's home. Gray told one witness several times
that he was "going to get" McClelland for firing his wife. Id. at 331,356
S.E.2d at 167.
2 Id. at 341,356 S.E.2d at 172.
3 1d. The gym bags contained between $12,000 and $13,000. Id. at
342, 356 S.E.2d at 173.
4 Id. at 341, 356 S.E.2d at 173.
5 Id. at 341-42, 356 S.E.2d at 173.
6 Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59, 61 (4th Cir. 1995). The Sorrell
murders were accomplished in a manner strikingly similar to the execu-
tion style of the McClelland murder. The body of Lisa Sorrell had been
found slumped in the front seat of a partially burned automobile. Lisa
Sorrell was killed by six gunshot wounds to the head, apparently inflicted
by a .32-caliber firearm. In the trunk of the automobile was the body of
Lisa's three-year-old child, Shanta Sorrell. Shanta Sorrell died of carbon
monoxide inhalation. Gray denied any involvement in the Sorrell mur-
ders. Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. at 345-46, 356 S.E.2d at 175.
7 Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 61.
8 Id.
police detective who investigated the Sorrell murders and by the state
medical examiner who performed the victims' autopsies. The additional
evidence was also to include photographs and forensic evidence of the
crime scene.
7
The following morning the penalty phase began. During an in-
chambers conference, Gray's counsel asked the court to exclude the
additional Sorrell evidence on the ground that it exceeded the scope of
corroborating evidence permissible under state law and that the defense,
having learned of it just the evening before, was unprepared to rebut it
that day. The court denied Gray's motion to exclude the additional
Sorrell murder evidence.8 The jury sentenced Gray to death.9
Gray's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct State
appeal 10 and his State habeas corpus petition was dismissed,11 with the
United States Supreme Court twice denying certiorari.
12
Gray then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
an evidentiary hearing and heard testimony from trial counsel and the
prosecution witnesses as to the events at sentencing. The district court
granted the writ and vacated Gray's sentence, finding that the prosecu-
tion had "violated the moral standards of fair play embodied in the Due
Process Clause" by unfairly surprising the defense with additional
evidence of Gray's unadjudicated acts. 13 The Commonwealth appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
14
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's granting of the writ
of habeas corpus. 15 The court held that the Commonwealth's use of the
supplemental evidence of the Sorrell murders as proof of future danger-
ousness was not an unconstitutional violation of due process.
16
9 Id. at 62.
10 Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. at 354, 356 S.E.2d at 180.
11 Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 62.
12 Gray v. Virginia, 484 U.S. 873 (1987) and Gray v. Thompson,
500 U.S. 949 (1991).
13 Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 62. The district court further found
that the evidence linking Gray to the Sorrell murders "was very question-
able." Gray v. Thompson, No. 3:91CV693, slip op. at 16 (E.D. Va. Aug.
25,1994), rev'd, 58 F.3d59 (4thCir. 1995). According to the court, "[t]he
[Sorrell] murders were the most highly publicized crimes in [the] history
of this [locale], and the primary connection between... Gray and the
Sorrell slayings was the testimony of... Gray's co-defendant." Id. The
district court pointed out that Tucker "had escaped prosecution for
capital murder in exchange for his testimony." Id. at 8. Under such
circumstances, such information should be viewed "with caution." Id. at
16. The district court also noted that aside from Tucker's testimony
incriminating Gray, "most of the evidence . . . support[ed] the
Commonwealth's original theory: [that] Timothy Sorrell[, the husband
and father of the victims,] committed the Sorrell murders." Id.
14 Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 62.
15 Id. at 67.
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. The Use of Undisclosed Evidence to Show Future Dangerous-
ness
A. Collateral Review of State Habeas Law
The Fourth Circuit stated thatbefore a federal court can consider the
merits of a habeas claim, that court must first analyze whether the habeas
petitioner seeks to expand the boundaries of existing law. The court
found that the district court never acknowledged this requirement in its
final order. Therefore, the Court of Appeals addressed the question, and
found that Gray's rule would be a novel claim barred from consideration
on federal review. 17
Gray relied heavily on Gardner v. Florida18 to argue that that the
Commonwealth's use of the "surprise" Sorrell evidence violated Due
Process. In Gardner, the sentencing judge had relied upon confidential
portions of a presentence report in deciding to sentence the defendant to
death, but did not disclose that information to the defense until judgment
was entered. 19 Because the defendant was sentenced "on the basis of
information that he had no opportunity to deny or explain," the sentenc-
ing proceeding was unconstitutional. 20
The Fourth Circuit, however, held that Gardner did not dictate the
conclusion that Gray had a constitutional right to some minimum level
of advance notice of the particulars of the prosecution's penalty case.
21
The court observed that Gray had not been sentenced on the basis of any
secret information, but rather, the evidence of his future dangerousness
was advanced in open court with Gray afforded the chance to cross-
examine the adverse witnesses.
22
Moreover, the Court of Appeals pointed out that defense counsel
had been informed of the additional evidence the evening before it was
introduced and that defense counsel interviewed an adverse witness that
evening. The court stated that if the defense had felt unprepared to
undertake effective cross-examination, it should have made a formal
motion for continuance; instead, counsel had moved only that the
evidence be excluded. Finally, the Fourth Circuit added that after this
supplemental Sorrell evidence was presented, Gray took the stand and
directly addressed the jury. The court stated, "[p]lainly, [Gray] had an
opportunity to explain or deny the evidence."
23
The Court of Appeals thus distinguished Gray's case from Gardner,
noting that Gardner itself warned against broad expansions of its
holding.24 The court then characterized Gray's claim as an attempt to use
Gardner as an entitlement to advance notice of witness statements and
corroborating evidence. The Fourth Circuit stated that it knew ofno cases
in which lack of notice, even at the trial on guilt and innocence phase, had
been found to offend the Due Process Clause.25 And, in light of the fact
that Gardner expressly avoided importing even established trial rights
into sentencing, the court found it implausible that it created sentencing
16 Id. at 66. The court rejected other claims by the defendant. Issues
that will not be addressed in this summary include: (1) the constitution-
ality of the "vileness" element as applied in Virginia; (2) whether due
process requires the appointment ofaprivate investigator for the defense;
(3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support conviction; and (4)
whether Gray had defaulted another claim that the prosecution had failed
to disclose evidence, separate and distinct from the Sorrell evidence, that
would tend to impeach yet another prosecution witness.
17 Id. at 64 (citing Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948,953 (1994)).
18 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
19 Id. at 353.
20 Id. at 362.
21 Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d at 64.
22 Id.
23 Id.
rights that are nonexistent at trial.
26
B. The Merits of Gray's Contention
Intriguingly, after the Court of Appeals went to great pains to
establish that it was precluded from reaching Gray's claim, the court
nevertheless evaluated the merits of Gray's contention, and found that it
"[rang] hollow on its facts."27 The court maintained that Gray had not
advanced any meaningful contention as to how he would have proceeded
any differently at the penalty phase had he known about the photographs,
the autopsy report, and the like sooner than the night before the penalty
phase was to begin. The Court of Appeals found it likely that Gray's case
would have unfolded in much the same fashion that it did.
28
The opinion's message is that capital defense attorneys should
object strongly and in as many ways possible, pointing out on the record
the prejudice suffered in terms of due process violations underBrady and
ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, one area of prejudice that
developed after trial was that Timothy Sorrell was the prime suspect in
the Sorrell murders.29 Gray argued that had he known that fact, he could
have better defused, during the penalty phase, the charge leveled at him.
However, the Court of Appeals, ignoring its earlier blitheful claim that
the defendant would have proceeded no differently had he had adequate
notice, went no further in determining the materiality of this exculpatory
evidence, because it "refuse[d] to be dragged into a mini-trial on the
respective strengths of the cases against [Timothy] Sorrell and [Gray]." 30
C. Lack of Notice and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Despite the Fourth Circuit's ruling, lack of nctice can be extremely
debilitating, especially in preparing to rebut Commonwealth evidence of
unadjudicated acts at the penalty phase. If given last minute notice,
defense counsel should object not only on due process grounds, but also
on the grounds that without sufficient notice counsel cannot provide
effective assistance. This claim clearly does have the long-standing
precedent, dating back to Powell v. Alabama,31 that the Fourth Circuit
found lacking in Gray's due process claim.
In Powell the Court stated that the time leading up to trial is, in terms
of assistance of counsel, "perhaps the most critical period of the proceed-
ings against [the] defendant-.... when consultation, thorough-going
investigation and preparation [are] vitally important .... 32 The Powell
Court further observed that prejudice can exist even where defense
counsel proceeded with their case. "It is not enough to assume that
counsel.., exercised their best judgment in proceeding to trial without
preparation. Neither they nor the court could say what a prompt and
thorough-going investigation might disclose as to the facts. No attempt
was made to investigate. No opportunity to do so was given."'33
While noting the "grave evil[]" of inexcusable delays and continu-
ances, the Powell Court stated that a defendant must not be stripped of
24 Id. Although Gardner extended due process to the sentencing
context, the extension was carefully circumscribed. The fact that due
process applied at sentencing did not transport into that phase of capital
proceedings "'the entire panoply of criminal trial procedural rights." Id.
at 64-65 (quoting Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358 n.9).
25 Id. at 64-65.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 66.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 66 n.3.
30 Id.
31 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
32 Powell, 287 U.S. at 57.
33 Id. at 58.
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sufficient time to have his counsel prepare his defense. The Court stated,
"[t]o do that is not to proceed promptly in the claim ... ofregulatedjustice
but to go forward with thehaste of the mob..: -34 The Court quoted, "[i]t
is vain to give the accused a day in court, with no opportunity to prepare
for it, or to guarantee him counsel without giving [counsel] any oppor-
tunity to acquaint himself with the facts or law of the case. ' 35 The Court
held, therefore, that due process required the assignment of counsel for
an otherwise incapable defendant and that that duty was not discharged
by an assignment "under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of
effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case."'36 Even Justice
Butler, dissenting in Powell, conceded that if defendants were "denied
the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of consultation and
opportunity of preparation for trial.., they were denied due process
of law .... ,-37
The Powell Court's emphasis on the need for trial counsel to have
an adequate chance to prepare applies with full force to the
Commonwealth's use of unadjudicated crimes to show future danger-
ousness; the proof of unadjudicated crimes often, as in Gray, will
resemble a trial in and of itself. Capital defense attorneys, therefore,
should strenuously argue that any curtailment of an adequate opportunity
for preparation will result in the same ineffective assistance that Powell
sought to prevent. Defense counsel should point out the prejudice
suffered in foregone areas of investigation, unpursued avenues of de-
fense, and lost opportunities for the thorough use of the exculpatory
evidence itself. Indeed, think of how different Gray's penalty phase
would have been ifthe defense had known Timothy Sorrell was the prime
suspect.
34 Id. at 59.
351d. (quoting Commonwealth v. O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169,173,148 A.
73,74-(1929)).
36 Id. at71.
37 Id. at 73-74 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
However, to make later claims of prejudice more meaningful and
resounding, the defense must make Brady requests as specific and all-
inclusive as possible. This will help the defense to show that exculpatory
evidence that was withheld or that would have been uncovered if given
adequate time to prepare would have been material and the case likely
would have unfolded in much different fashion that it did.
In United States v. Cronic,38 the United States Supreme Court has
given defendants a guide on how to state an ineffectiveness claim
because defense counsel has been denied adequate notice. Citing Powell,
the Court held that in certain circumstances defense counsel may be so
handicapped that they could not possibly provide effective assistance of
counsel. 39 The Court stated that certain criteria were relevant to this
determination:40 "'(1) [T]he time afforded for investigation and prepa-
ration; (2) the experience of counsel; (3) the gravity of the charge; (4) the
complexity of possible defenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses to
counsel.'
41
Capital defense attorneys faced with inadequate notice should
sculpt their claims in terms of Powell and Cronic, pointing out how the
lack of notice will force them to provide ineffective assistance. The
criteria announced in Cronic provide the template for crafting the
ineffective assistance claim and provide a guide for arguing the materi-
ality of the evidence withheld.
Summary and analysis by:
Douglas S. Collica
38 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
39 Id. at 659-660.
40 Id. at 663.
41 Id. at 652 (quoting United States v. Golub, 638 F.2d 185, 189
(10th Cir. 1980)).
CORRELL v. THOMPSON
63 F.3d 1279 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Charles W. Bousman was robbed and murdered August 11,
1985 in Franklin County, Virginia. 1 Walter Milton Correll was
arrested and taken to the Roanoke City Police Department on
August 16th. Although Correll requested an attorney early into the
first interrogation that evening, his request was not honored. He
gave two incriminating statements that evening: one to a Roanoke
officer and one to Detective Overton of the Frederick County
Sheriff's Department, both without the benefit of counsel.
2
On August 18th, Correll was escorted to Appomattox, Virginia
to undergo a polygraph examination. 3 The record did not indicate
1 Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279, 1283 (1995).
2 1d. at 1284.
3 Id.
whether Correll waived his rights before the test. During the exami-
nation, the examiner indicated to Correll that an answer indicated
deception. 4 Subsequently, Correll was transported to the Franklin
County Jail where he asked to speak with Detective Overton in order
to explain his polygraph results. 5 Correll waived his rights and gave
his third statement regarding the murder.
The two statements given by Correll on August 16th were
suppressed at trial, but the third statement following the polygraph
examination was admitted into evidence. 6 Correll waived his right
to ajury trial and was convicted of capital murder in the commission
of robbery. The judge sentenced Correll to death based on the
vileness of the crime.
4 1d. at 1287.
51d. at 1284.
6 Id. at 1284.
